“泡沫”如鬼（There are no real estate bubbles in China）

董藩

    近些年，中国房地产价格一直在上涨，政府也一直在与房价作斗争。快速上涨的房价引起了国际舆论界和学术界的高度关注，绝大部分学者甚至外国的一些诺贝尔奖得主都认为中国房地产市场存在严重的泡沫。关于中国房地产市场的“泡沫论”其实早在上个世纪90年代就存在，但至今我们未见“泡沫破灭”。我不得不说，“房地产泡沫”就是那个传说中的鬼，都说有，其实并不存在。

一、需求爆发、供应管制导致房价快速上涨

    房地产价格的上涨是基本经济规律的反映。与一般商品供求关系不同，房地产的供应总是受到来自城市规划、土地供应计划、建筑红线、规划指标的严格控制，而需求至多受到财政政策、货币政策的调节。于是，在总需求和总供给共同决定价格水平的过程中，需求显得主动、强势、变化快，而供应则被动、弱势、变化慢。总需求象一个强势的成人，而总供给则象一个被成人引领的孩子，不能决定价格变化的方向，只有跟着总需求变化的趋势而变动，即不断上升。再加上房地产这种商品很特殊，没有替代品，需求无法因价格上涨而转移；由于人口的增加和人均需求量的增加，房地产的需求规模又呈现只扩大不缩小的趋势，于是房地产价格上涨就表现为一种规律，下跌只发生在战争、瘟疫、连续的地震、特殊的政治事件、经济危机、严厉而错误的调控、税制调整等特殊情况下。

   在中国，房地产价格除了要反映基本经济规律外，还受到一系列具有中国特色的国情背景、制度背景和意识背景的影响。例如人多地少、人口继续增长、城市化进程加剧、经济高速增长、城乡收入差异严重、家庭规模小型化、生活方式的演化这些国情背景，以及住房制度改革、金融制度改革、社会福利制度现状甚至城乡阶层意识和群居意识存在、负债消费意识的崛起，都强化着房地产供求关系，使其显得更加紧张。这里只提示一点，仅仅因为离婚率上升、未婚独居大龄青年比率上升、年轻人因结婚离巢分居、养老购二套房、为上学方便而购二套房、非法同居购房等生活方式变化导致的需求就比城市化带来的需求还旺盛，从而导致房价不断上涨，而绝大部分学者由于学科视野和思维上的原因，对此是视而不见的。

二、为什么绝大多数学者的“泡沫论”是错的

“房地产泡沫”就是指由房地产投机因素所引起的房地产价格脱离市场基础的情况，也就是土地和房屋价格极高，与其使用价值(市场价值的基础)不符。虽然账面上价值增长很高，但实际上不具备稳定实现的基础，形成一种表面上的虚假繁荣。大多数学者和经济界人士都认为中国房地产市场存在严重泡沫，其实这是完全错误的。在接受俄罗斯一家媒体记者采访时我曾经说过：房价上涨是一种正常现象。在中国，和俄罗斯一样，之前都是计划经济体制。国家用行政手段控制房价，房价很低。在我们经济体制走向市场化之后，房价会像弹簧一样弹起来，之前这个弹簧是被压着的。

有人认为中国房地产业以远超过10%的高增长速度持续增长5年后，按照其固有周期必然调整，但未调整，这就是有“泡沫”了。其实，他们的理解有严重错误：他们不知道受其它因素影响，房价上升阶段会延长；也不知道房地产周期存在特殊性——一般表现为房价指数波动和投资增长率的波动，而非价格波动；

有人说中国房地产价格一路飙升，导致房价收入比超出可接受范围。房价收入比的国际标准是3～6∶1，但中国各地远高于这个数字，“泡沫严重”。他们不知道最早得出这个结论的学者早就否定了自己的结论，更不知道外国农村的房子计算在商品房之列，而中国却不算；不知道外国没有单位内部集资建房、房改房、小产权房、城中村和城市周围农民自建房，中国不仅大量存在、价格很低而且未计入商品房价格中；不知道外国计算房价采用的是中位值，而中国采用的是平均值，同样的样本计算结果差别很大；不知道外国的土地供给是私有制下的竞争性供应，而中国是政府垄断供应；不知道外国多是小城镇，而中国遍地是大中城市，城镇规模对房价具有重要影响。外国有外国的背景，中国有中国的国情，围绕房价收入比，至少有十几个影响因素中外完全不同，怎能比较呢？如果真能统一比较的口径，会发现中国真实房价大概只有公布水平的1/3多些。

还有学者拿租金售价比说事，认为房屋每平方米建筑面积的月租金与房价之间的比值在成熟市场经济国家一般不超过1：200，而中国明显超过这个国际标准，所以就有“泡沫”了。这些学者不知道中外房价的含义与计算方法不同，更不知道中外居住文化、土地制度、宏观调控对这个指标产生了怎样的影响。仅从居住文化看，中国人强烈喜欢买房子，很不情愿租房子，这就必然导致买卖市场发育强劲，价格高涨，而租赁市场承租户低端，需求规模小，租金较低。

三、新政下房地产市场的走势

根据统计数据，房价由1987年的每平方米408元到2009年的4695元，一路走高。这本是经济、社会发展的正常结果，但由于引发了舆论对抗，招致中央政府的严厉调控。最近出台的一些政策除了努力扩大供应的经济措施外，还具有极强的需求管制色彩，而且中央政府通过行政问责制去保证调控结果的实现。

这样，在短期内，供求关系会发生明显变化——从需求角度看，有人会担心随后的政策（税收、利率）变化而观望；有人会担心多套房子在交易时成本增加而不敢购买；有人会担心第二套房子的认定标准以及交易执行条件过于严厉而不敢入市；也有人因盼望“房地产泡沫”破灭而推迟购买。于是市场会出现恐慌情绪，需求下降。从供应角度看，会出现所谓“炒房团”的抛售——其实这部分数量不多，但被媒体一炒作，影响很大，影响业主的判断。部分多套房者会担心资产缩水而抛售；部分开发商会降价出货；半年后大量增量房产出现。这样，供应明显增加而需求下降，价格可能松动，部分城市可能价格会明显震荡。

让人担心的不是房价的波动，而是调控中如下五点情况如何控制：

第一，金融市场受到冲击，信贷质量受到威胁：部分信贷资金被迫进入产能过剩领域；优质按揭客户贷款受到限制；如果房价下跌二三成，违约客户还会明显增加。

第二，退房纠纷等明显增加，影响社会稳定：前期交了订金未交首付、未贷款的可能大量要求退货；交了首付但贷款审批不下来的也会要求退货；已经办完贷款又要退房的也会出现。

第三，由于房价下跌与一般商品价格下跌相比对交易量的影响不同，下跌时需求往往沉淀，购买行为终止，而供应量上升却很快，而该行业从产业链上看具有“渔网效应”，其他绝大部分行业又存在产能过剩情况，于是可能在2010年底2011年初出现2008年底2009年初市场恶化的情况，经济增长受到影响。

第四，在调控名义下，会出现许多倒退行为，政府对开发商、对下级政府的权力在增加、强化，腐败有进一步恶化的倾向。

第五，市场机制受到破坏，为今后的经济、社会运行埋下隐患。一些合理需求受到调控伤害，人口流动受到抑制，房地产质量无法把控，购买、居住者遭遇财产、生命隐患，这是很可怕的事情。

There are no real estate bubbles in China

DONG FAN

The rising real estate prices are a reflection of the basic economic law. Different from the supply-demand relationship of ordinary commodities, real estate supply is always subjected to strict controls in terms of urban planning, land supply plan, building line and planning targets, while demand is at most influenced by fiscal and monetary policy. The demand for housing, as a special commodity without substitute, couldn’t be transferred because of rising prices. Due to population expansion as well as elevated per capita housing demand, the demand for real estate is expanding straightly. So housing prices rise reflects a kind of law and price plunge only happens when encountering some special circumstances, such as wars, plagues, continuous earthquakes, special political events, economic recession, strict but misleading regulation measures and taxation adjustments. 

In China, except for subjected to the basic economic law, real estate prices are also influenced by a range of national conditions with Chinese characteristics, such as vast population and limited land, accelerated urbanization process, high-speed economic growth, widening gap between urban and rural residents and diminution of family size, as well as the ongoing reform on residential institution, financial system and social welfare network, plus the existence of urban-rural stratum consciousness and strengthened intention of consumption on debt. All these factors are straining the real estate supply-demand relation.

“Property bubbles” refer to the situation in which rapid increases in valuations of land and housing caused by speculation factors reach unsustainable levels relative to incomes and other economic elements. That many scholars and economists believe there is a serious bubble in China’s real estate market is completely wrong. Under the past planned economy system, the authority used to maintain housing prices at a low level by administrative measures, while after embracing marketization, housing prices are supposed to bounce up like a mechanical spring which was depressed previously.

Some people argue that with the surging housing prices, the price-to-income ratio in major cities is much higher than the international standard, and it has fairly overstepped ordinary people’s ability to shoulder economically. So “the property bubble is very serious”. However, they don’t know that the scholar who first came to this conclusion had already denied it. In foreign countries, rural houses are included in the list of commercial housing, and there are no housing built by funds collected inside units, houses distributed through housing reform, houses with limited property rights, villages inside cities and houses constructed by farmers in suburbs. While in China, there are large numbers of low-cost houses that are not counted in commercial housing prices. Land supply, overseas, is competitive under private ownership while governments at all levels in China monopolize the supply. There are many small townships overseas while large and medium-sized cities could be seen all over China, and we know city scale has great influence on housing prices. Affected by so many factors which are different at home and abroad, the price-to-income ratio could not reflect the real situation.

With regard to the rent-to-price ratio, some scholars believe that because this ratio in China has far exceeded the international standard, 1/200, in mature market economies, so there is a housing bubble in China. They ignored the difference in calculating housing prices in and out of China, and influence on the ratio caused by different residential culture, land ownership systems, macro-control measures. From the perspective of residential culture, Chinese people’s strong aspiration of owning a house and reluctance on renting inevitably boost houses trading and prompt property prices, while with renting demand mainly coming from low-income groups, rental cannot be high.

Except for striving to expand housing supply, measures unveiled recently by the authority have a strong intention in controlling demand, and the central government will try to ensure the targeted results through its administrative accountability system.

As a result, the supply-demand relation will change significantly in the short term. From the perspective of demand, some homebuyers will take a wait-and-see attitude for fear of later policy (tax and interest rate) changes; some may worry about the rising transaction costs; some postpone their purchase plan awaiting the “bubble bursting”. The panic sentiment leads to decline in demand. For supply, “real estate speculators” will undersell their hoarding houses, the number of which is not large, but it has great influence on the judgment of business owners after being sensationalized by the media. For fearing assets devaluation, some proprietors with several apartments on hand will join in underselling their houses. Some developers will cut prices for sales. A larger number of incremental houses are expected to flood into the housing market half a year later. With supply increasing and demand falling, housing prices might begin to fall and certain cities will see remarkable price volatility.     

What is worrisome isn’t housing prices fluctuation, but how to address problems emerging in the macro-control process. The financial market will be impacted, threatening credit quality. Part of credit funds would be forced to flow into fields with excess capacity; high-quality mortgage loans face limitations; if housing prices plunge by 20 or 30 percent, contract violation cases will increase markedly.

When housing prices plunge, demands usually hibernate and purchases suspend, which in turn will intensify the overcapacity of industries relying on property development. So the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 might see a sluggish market like what happened late 2008 and early 2009.